Here's Hilbert, Foundations of Geometry:
Let us consider three distinct systems of things.
The things composing the first system, we will
call points...; those of the second, we will call straight
lines...;
and those of the third system, we will call planes....We think of these points, straight lines, and planes
as having certain mutual relations....The complete and exact description of these relations
follows as a consequence of the axioms of geometry.
The things called points, lines, and planes are just things, which are assumed to exist. No further definition is given. However from the assumptions made about the existence of relations and the properties these have as well as a few other assumptions, Hilbert constructs geometry. Euclid on the other hand gives definitions:
- A point is that which has not even one part.
- A line is breadthless length.
Euclid defines point in terms of part and line in terms of dimensions. But part, breadthless, and length themselves are not defined. If one were to define those terms, they would be in terms of other undefined terms (unless one were to make a circular definition). The modern way is to start with things -- that is to say, a set (or class) of objects. The elements of the set are considered undefined.
Measurement as a basis for geometry is introduced [G.D.Birkhoff, A set of postulates for plane geometry (based on scale and protractor), Ann. of Math. 33
(1932), 329–345]. Birkhoff further influenced the teaching of geometry by producing a textbook Basic Geometry with R. Beatly. This approach was later adopted for high school in the US (see, for instance, Moise and Downs, Geometry, 1964). Birkhoff uses, without definition, the term undefined:
Undefined elements and relations.
The undefined elements are (a) points,...and (b) certain classes of points called (straight) lines.
The undefined relations are (c) distance between any two points,...
(d) angle formed by three ordered points....
To respond to a question by the OP in a comment to another question, the points and lines are assumed to be given (or supplied) but there is no definition of them. What they are arises out of the axioms that are assumed.
The example given in the comment raises the question whether the $x$ is undefined in $f(x) = x^2$, which seems a different issue if I've understood the point correctly. Ignoring the modern definition of $f$ as a set, one could say that $f(x) = x^2$ is short for "let $f$ be the function defined by the property that for all $x \in {\bf R}$, $f(x) = x^2$. The variable $x$ represents an element from the set ${\bf R}$. As a matter of logic, a variable is indefinite, and I think that is different that being defined or undefined. A closer analogy would be to say that in the definition of $f$, the set ${\bf R}$ is undefined. That is an approach some analysis texts: a set ${\bf R}$ is assumed to exist and further assumed to have certain properties.
P.S.
Some quibbles about Wiggins question:
What does Wiggins mean by define, as in "define 'undefined term'"? Whatever is meant by define, undefined means it was not defined. This is not really a serious objection, but the wording, at least in the excerpt, might be confusing.
What does Wiggins mean by draw? This seems more serious (see also below). I know very well what it means in art class. Mathematically, I am uncertain what can be meant by "the way we draw them." There are several problems with the way I draw them. I've not drawn a mathematical line ever. Two points do not determine a straight line, because there is always some error; if I draw a line twice through the same two points, I get two different lines. Likewise, extending a straight errs, when I do it. But I imagine two points determine a line and I can imagine my figures are perfect. I dismiss my error and do not think my lack of perfection disproves the axioms. Maybe Wiggins is after that sort of explanation, and that mathematically lines need not be drawn that way (in which, say, lines have a thickness or are not "straight," whatever that means). I was taught in H.S. that we cannot draw a geometric point or line, which is only a slightly different explanation. It also sounds like Wiggins might be opening the door to models of non-Euclidean geometry. The might be that we do not have to imagine that straight lines follow our intuition of straightness, but that we should deduce properties only from the axioms.
P.P.S.
For Proclus (Comm. Eucl., 400s CE), "leading geometry out of Calypso’s arms, so to speak, to more perfect intellectual insight and emancipating it from the pictures projected in imagination" would be the "perfect culmination" of studying Euclid. This shows that the concern that images and what we imagine about them might lead us astray in our reasoning goes back to ancient times. Proclus' take is somewhat opposed to the perspective in Wiggins' question. Wiggins seems to think his readers will find comfort in familiar images and definitions for every thing. His readers might fear not having them. The term "chaos" might be a pun as it tends to imply formlessness, which would be an ungeometrical state. I think the question is asking for an explanation of why mathematics is not invalid just because of undefined terms and "straight" do not have to be what we imagine as straight.
P.P.P.S.
As a side note, in both Euclid and Hilbert, but not Birkhoff, a line is not a set of points, which unnerves most college students. Some find it liberating, though.